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THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study sought to investigate the link between corporate governance and sustainability in oil and 
gas firms across two countries. Sustainability was conceptualized as including three firm obligations: 
(1) economic performance; (2) social responsiveness; and (3) environmental quality. Using archival 
data from 53 Australian and 65 Canadian oil and gas companies from 2004, we found that Australian 
firms were more socially responsive while Canadian firms demonstrated higher levels of 
environmental quality. Board size was a significant predictor of social responsiveness and 
environmental quality for Australian firms, whereas none of the corporate governance variables 
provided explanations for the sustainability levels of Canadian firms.  
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According to Bansal (2001: 48), firms who do not respond to sustainability will “almost 
certainly face extinction.” In line with this bold assertion, corporate sustainability is perhaps the most 
recent of firm imperatives argued to better align a firm’s economic mandate with broader social 
objectives. In the main, corporate sustainability refers to a firm’s ability to simultaneously produce 
economic, social, and environmental performance (Elkinton, 1997; Bansal, 2001; Wilson and 
Lombardi, 2001; Steurer et al., 2005).  There are at least three reasons for corporate sustainability’s 
growing popularity.  
      First, in recent years climate change has been overwhelmingly acknowledged as a global 
problem – even amongst staunch skeptics such as governments in Australia and the United States – 
requiring business action on environmental issues to help arrest their potential long-term negative 
impacts on societal welfare (Hoffman, 2005; Kolk and Pinske, 2005; Lash and Wellington, 2007). 
Second, reports demonstrate that investment managers around the world are increasingly factoring 
social and environmental performance into their analysis of companies, suggesting that economic 
performance is no longer the sole criterion for firm valuations (Mercer Investment Consulting, 2006). 
Lastly, sustainability is viewed by some scholars as the new battleground for competitive advantage, 
one in which firms must find a balanced approach between economic, social, and environmental 
strategies in order to outperform rivals (Porter and Kramer, 2006).   
      Given the interest in and purported significance of sustainability, an important question 
remains: what drives firms to try to generate performance across economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions? Some have suggested pressure from institutions such as governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Moon, 2004; Campbell, 2007). Others argue that employee 
motives drive firms to engage in social and environmental activities (Aguilera et al., 2007). Still others 
demonstrate that firm culture is instrumental in shaping firms’ approaches towards delivering societal 
benefits beyond the economic sphere (Maignan et al., 1999). However, according to research from 
management consultancy firm McKinsey and Company, institutional investors attribute as much as 
40% of a firm’s value to the quality of their corporate governance (Monks, 2002), suggesting the 
importance of this institutional factor in determining firms’ ability to drive performance, economic or 
otherwise.  
     Logically, in an era of expert testimony and high profile discussions on environmental issues 
(Mendonca and Oppenheim, 2007; Stern, 2007) and intense debate over firms’ social responsiveness 
(Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Brugmann and Prahalad, 2007), those exercising corporate 
governance would be expected to ascertain the requirements of myriad  stakeholders in order to meet 
such pressing strategic challenges; they would also be expected to oversee the effective deployment of 
resources to enable combined economic, social, and environmental performance. Unfortunately, there 
is a dearth of research examining the link between corporate governance and sustainability. 
Commentary, meta-analysis reports, and recent research on corporate governance (e.g., Dalton et al., 
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1998, 1999; Daily et al., 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, 2006) reveals that dependent variables of 
interest are variations of firm financial (economic) performance. Thus, to the degree that corporate 
governance is an institutional factor driving sustainability, empirical studies have yet to offer any 
conclusive evidence.    
      To fill gaps in the literature, this research provides several important contributions. First, a 
primary interest of corporate governance research has been to test the relationship between the 
construct and financial performance. This paper explores relationships between corporate governance 
and sustainable performance, including its economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Second, 
according to Thomas and McDaniel (1990), the way boards are structured to process information 
about strategic issues limits or enhances recognition of issue stimuli, impedes the search for data, and, 
ultimately, affects organizational performance. We argue that addressing three major firm 
responsibilities places considerable information-processing demands on board members. Using the 
information- processing perspective (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993), we develop hypotheses that 
predict specific links between board structure variables and economic, social, and environmental 
performance. Third, we test our hypotheses by using a single industry in two different countries: 
Australia and Canada. Canada appears to be underrepresented in the literature, so our study adds to an 
international perspective of corporate governance. The industry studied is oil and gas. Oil and gas 
firms face significant social and environmental challenges, making the industry an ideal setting for this 
analysis. Lastly, evidence from the research is significant for management researchers and 
practitioners. Addressing the posited questions will allow scholars to offer relevant advice on the 
likely effects of various corporate governance structures on sustainability.     
BACKGROUND ON SUSTAINABILITY 
Sustainability focuses on meeting current needs without compromising future generations’ 
ability to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). Operationalized at the firm level, sustainability 
consists of three interlocking principles: 1) economic performance; 2) social responsiveness; and 3) 
environmental quality (Elkinton, 1997; Bansal, 2001; Wilson and Lombardi, 2001; Steurer et al., 
2005).     
Economic performance 
Private business is the vehicle for economic performance (Henderson, 2005). Economic 
prosperity results from competitive, market-based activities; namely, from the value creation activities 
of firms (Mizik and Jacobson, 2003). Firms create value when they provide customers with products 
and services they wish to buy. According to Porter (1985) and Conner (1991), firms increase value 
creation through innovation in products and services, lowering costs of inputs, or realizing efficiencies 
in scale and scope. When firms create and capture value, consumers benefit through better products 
and services, shareholders benefit through dividends and increases in the value of equity, employees 
benefit through salaries, and society benefits through higher living standards (Holliday et al., 2002). 
However, in the process of value creation by firms, natural resource depletion, environmental 
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degradation, and the disruption of communities and worker welfare and health can be potential 
negative by-products; thus, economic performance is tied intrinsically to social responsiveness and 
environmental quality (Schmidheiny, 1992). 
Social responsiveness 
Firms are increasingly required to respond to social issues (Augilera et al., 2007). Social 
issues are issues that are problematic to society (Mahon and Waddock, 1992). General examples 
include AIDS, poverty, and obesity. However, social issues can also be very specific to firms, such as 
working conditions, product safety, and equal rights (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). Carroll (1979) further 
argues that firms have responsibilities to the communities they operate in, including volunteering and 
contributing money to various social or cultural enterprises. What such viewpoints suggest is that 
firms have responsibilities to society, not just shareholders. Capturing this perspective, Donaldson and 
Dunfee (1994, 1995, 1999) stipulate that firms are obligated to demonstrate responsible behavior to all 
stakeholders, whether inside or outside corporate walls, thus making social responsiveness an 
important dimension of sustainability (cf. Elkinton, 1997). 
Environmental quality 
Economic activity invariably impacts the natural environment, in ways such as decreases in 
biodiversity, ozone depletion, greenhouse gas emissions, waste by-products, and deforestation 
(Doering et al., 2002). All firms have an environmental impact, ranging from lighting of office 
facilities to the waste and emissions generated from production processes. More specifically, scholars 
have identified three main areas in which firms can address environmental quality. First, firms can 
control pollution through responsible waste disposal (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Second, 
Klassen and Whybark (1999) suggest that firms can prevent pollution through the innovative use of 
processes and technologies in the production process. Lastly, firms can engage in product stewardship 
by using fewer materials in production and by disassembling for recycling or reuse at the end of the 
product lifecycle (Hart, 1995). If the natural environment is compromised in the present, future 
generations will be limited in their ability to access basic resources such as clear air and water 
(WCED, 1987), highlighting the importance of environmental quality in the triadic principles of 
sustainability. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES  
Sustainability is current one of the more hotly contested issues in the media, and at 
governmental and business levels. At the heart of the issue is the degree to which corporations, both 
large and small, have a responsibility not only to continue to produce economic prosperity, but to do 
so while demonstrating both social and environmental sensitivities (Elkington, 1997; Bansal, 2001; 
Wilson and Lombardi, 2001; Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Steurer et al., 2005). As such, sustainability 
is emerging as part of the social context within which firms operate (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; 
Brugmann and Prahalad, 2007). However, while a firm has discretion with respect to their level of 
response to sustainability, failure to conform to critical, institutionalized norms can threaten a firm’s 
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legitimacy, resources and, ultimately, its existence (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991; Oliver, 1991). Of primary interest then is understanding if there are links between 
corporate governance and sustainability. 
Corporate governance, information processing and sustainability 
Studying how firms are structured to provide governance and oversight (i.e., board structure) 
is critical because it helps to understand the roles of boards and how these roles impact on 
organizational performance (Daily et al., 2003; Finegold et al., 2007). According to Henderson and 
Fredrickson (1996), one of the chief issues in structuring boards is to ensure adequate information 
processing; the effective execution of this task is critical to organizational functioning and 
performance. We posit that sustainability is a complex corporate imperative that places considerable 
information-processing demands on firms. 
Sustainability is complex and multidimensional, in that firms have three obligations in society. 
Firms not only are expected to produce economic results, but they are also expected to simultaneously 
demonstrate environmental and social performance (Elkington, 1997; Steurer et al., 2005). These 
obligations result in complex business decisions with major social, economic, and environmental 
consequences.  For instance, as a signatory to the Equator Principles, the ANZ Bank is currently 
assessing its willingness to finance the Gunn’s pulp mill development in Tasmania, based on the 
possible negative social and environmental consequences of the development rather than its economic 
viability. The ability to balance economic growth with the broader goals of environmental and social 
performance increases demands on information processing and is likely to create many challenges in 
decision making. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, dimensions of board structure posited to 
be associated with sustainability are identified and hypotheses about such associations are given. 
Board Size. Several scholars (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Mak and Kusnadi, 
2005) argue that smaller boards are more effective than larger ones. However, this perspective is 
offered in the context of improving firm economic performance and does not take into account the 
increased information-processing demands of sustainability. Sustainability is complex from the 
perspective that firms, in a sense, have three primary obligations to society: along with economic 
results, they also need to demonstrate social responsiveness and environmental quality (Elkington, 
1997; Bansal, 2001; Wilson and Lombardi, 2001; Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Steurer et al., 2005). 
This increases demands on information processing and decision making, as firms have to contend with 
multiple – and potentially conflicting – demands on firm strategies and resources. There are three 
ways in which larger boards are predicted to improve the ability to process information. 
First, as firms increase the number of members on boards they increase the number of items 
that the group can absorb and recall during the decision-making process (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1993). Logically, given the amount of information that would need to be discussed and absorbed with 
respect to sustainability, the expectation is that larger board size would help facilitate a response to 
sustainability issues. Second, a larger board would increase the number of individual judgments that 
 
 7
can be used to correct errors that occur during decision-making processes. According to Amason and 
Sapienze (1997), larger groups tend to produce more cognitive conflict. Conflict helps to open up the 
solutions and ensures more rigorous examination of the issues. In the case of sustainability, given 
broad stakeholder demands and interests across a potentially large number of issues, larger boards 
facilitate issue resolution in order to affect workable strategies and policies.  Lastly, following group 
researchers (e.g., Hill, 1982; Jackson, 1992; Watson et al., 1993), larger board sizes are not only 
expected to increase the number of potential solutions to evaluating issues of sustainability, but also to 
increase the range of perspectives that can be applied and considered when evaluating problems. 
Hence: 
 General Proposition 1: Board size is positively related to sustainability.    
H1a: Board size is positively related to economic performance.    
H1b: Board size is positively related to social responsiveness. 
H1c: Board size is positively related to environmental quality. 
CEO duality. Duality refers to the situation in which an executive holds both chairperson of 
the board and CEO roles. A common argument in favor of duality suggests that having one individual 
serve as both chairperson and CEO establishes unity of command and clarity in decision-making 
authority (Finklestein and D’Aveni, 1994; Daily and Dalton, 1997). However, with respect to the 
multiple issues and challenges of sustainability, firms may need to delegate authority and the division 
of responsibility.  
      By splitting the roles of chairperson of the board and CEO, firms can infuse more power and 
authority into their organization, and can also add a potential information conduit to the board. Thus, 
we make the argument that duality hinders the information-processing capacity of the board. That is, 
duality likely limits the breadth of key positions involved in decision making and the overall level of 
information-processing capacity of the firm’s top strategists. By splitting the roles of chairperson of 
the board and CEO, a firm disperses power and authority and increases information processing. Given 
that sustainability requires a broad focus across economic, social, and environmental responsibilities, 
the expectation is that duality hinders the ability of firms to address the many complex demands of 
fulfilling a sustainability strategy. Therefore:  
    General Proposition 2: CEO duality is negatively related to sustainability.    
H2a: CEO duality is negatively related to economic performance.    
H2b: CEO duality is negatively related to social responsiveness. 
H2c: CEO duality is negatively related to environmental quality. 
Gender. Gender is one of the most debated diversity issues in politics, society in general, and 
at the corporate board level (Bilimoria, 2000; Fondas and Sassalos, 2000; Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2004; Hillman and Cannella, 2007). There is evidence to suggest that women differ from men 
regarding traits, attitudes, values, and skills at problem-solving. For example, women have been found 
to be more orientated toward supporting and maintaining relationships than men (Hisrich and Brush, 
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1994; Rosener, 1995), to be strong in the areas of idea generation and innovation, and are generally to 
be more satisfied with their jobs than men (Rosener, 1995). Given these and other potential 
differences, the expectation is that there are several ways women board members offer unique 
perspectives to help drive sustainable performance. 
      First, women board members can make a valuable contribution to information processing by 
providing unique perspectives on strategic issues (Bryan, 1995; Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
According to Burke (2000), by increasing the presence of women on boards, firms can enrich board 
information, perspectives, debate, and decision making. Second, women are not part of the ‘old boys’ 
network, which Brennan and McCafferty (1997) argue allows them to be more independent with 
respect to evaluating information and in making strategic decisions. Third, evidence suggests that 
women may have a better understanding of consumer behavior, the needs of customers, and 
opportunities for companies in meeting those needs (Mattis, 1993; Brennan and McCafferty, 1997; 
Natividad, 2005). Given that customers are a key stakeholder of firms and directly relate to firms’ 
economic, social, and environmental responsibilities (Carroll, 1979; Clarkson, 1995), women on 
boards are expected to be important in driving sustainability. Fourth, women on boards can be 
associated with so-called ‘soft’ issues such as charity, philanthropy, and other social causes (Bilimoria 
and Piderit, 1994). While perhaps not part of the core economic function of firms, social issues are 
nonetheless critical to sustainability (Elkington, 1997). Lastly, given women’s orientation towards 
supporting and maintaining relationships, Biggins (1999) argues that women better represent the needs 
of all stakeholders, which aids in generating and sharing information in the formulation of strategy and 
in decisions made regarding policies of firms, including those related to sustainability. Given their 
roles: 
General Proposition 3: Women representation on the Board is positively related to 
sustainability.    
H3a: Women representation on the Board is positively related to economic performance.    
H3b: Women representation on the Board is positively related to social responsiveness. 
H3c: Women representation on the Board is positively related to environmental quality. 
Insider versus outsider representation. Because of the complex information needs and the 
difficulties of decision making with respect to responding to multiple stakeholder needs (Mitchell et 
al., 1997), outsider director representation is expected to help facilitate sustainable business strategies. 
According to Zahra et al. (1993), increasing the number of outside directors on boards increases the 
level of diversity. By increasing diversity, sensitivity levels are increased with respect to multiple 
stakeholder needs, which provide resources in the form of multiple perspectives that are not available 
with boards made up of only insiders (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Outsider representation on boards 
also increases the breadth of information that can be shared and the range of perspectives that can be 
given. Williams and O’Reilly (1998) argue that individuals tend to interact more easily and frequently 
with similar individuals; thus, by having more outsiders on boards, access to more information through 
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external peer networks helps to avoid the tendency towards groups that think alike, or groupthink, 
which is often associated with boards that are comprised of only insiders (cf. Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Further, Zahra and Stanton (1988) and Wang and Dewhirst (1992) have found that outside 
directors recognize that shareholders are not the only actors interested in the firm, and demonstrate a 
high level of consciousness about the needs and expectations of multiple stakeholders. These 
additional stakeholders include actors such as local communities, employees, suppliers, and 
governmental agencies, each of whom brings demands regarding social and environmental issues. 
Bringing in a greater level of knowledge of multiple stakeholder needs increases information-
processing and decision-making capabilities. Thus, the following is proposed: 
General Proposition 4: Outside director representation on the Board is positively related to 
sustainability.    
H4a: Outside director representation on the Board is positively related to economic 
performance.    
H4b: Outside director representation on the Board is positively related to social 
responsiveness. 




Oil and gas accounts for over 63% of the world’s primary energy needs and directly and 
indirectly employs millions of people around the globe (Grant, 2003). As such, the oil and gas industry 
is of key concern with respect to issues of sustainability (Levy and Kolk, 2002; Grant, 2003; OGP, 
2006; Anderson, 2007) and is an ideal industry for investigation. With respect to the this study, our 
sample was selected from firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in the ‘Energy’ Global 
Industry Classification System (GICS) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) under the classification 
of ‘junior oil and gas firms’ and ‘oil and gas producers’. We selected firms that filed an annual report 
in the 2004 financial year.  
      There were 117 companies quoted on the ASX at 28 May 2005 under the ‘Energy’ GICS 
classification. We removed 28 firms whose principal activities were not the exploration and/or 
production of oil and gas. We removed a further 6 firms that were investment trusts/funds. We 
excluded 17 more firms that had listed after 31 December 2004. An additional 13 firms were removed 
as they had not been listed for a consecutive period of 24 months from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 
2004. We were left with a sample of 53 firms.  
     There were 262 companies listed on the TSX classified as junior oil and gas firms (141) or oil 
and gas producers (121), and that filed an annual report for the 2004 financial year. Firms operating in 
the oil and gas service industry were excluded as the focus of our study is on the firms that explore, 
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develop and produce oil and gas. We were left with 65 firms that had been listed on the TSX for a 
period greater than 24 months.  
      An underlying assumption of this study was that the annual report is firms’ primary means of 
communicating economic (financial), social, and environmental related information to stakeholders. 
The annual report is often the most widely distributed document that firms make publicly available, 
one in which management has considerable discretion over disclosures made. Further support for the 
annual report is that existing studies exploring issues of sustainability focus on annual reports (e.g., 
Cormier et al., 2005). The use of supplementary reports (e.g., CSR, environmental, sustainability) is 
not widespread in Australia or Canada. Therefore, we expected most economic, social, and 
environmental information to be disclosed within the annual report. 
Dependent variables 
Economic performance. To measure economic performance, we chose return on equity 
(ROE). ROE is a widely used measurement to ascertain firms’ economic performance and has been 
used extensively in corporate governance studies (Dalton et al., 1998, 1999). We calculated ROE by 
dividing the net profit/(loss) by the book value of equity for each firm. As we are examining publicly 
listed firms, we thought it most appropriate to use a measure of financial performance that took into 
account the investment of equity made by shareholders. All data for ROE were obtained from 
company annual reports from 2004. 
Social responsiveness and Environmental quality. To measure the degree of social 
responsiveness and environmental quality, we used the common approach of annual report disclosure 
(Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005). Disclosure in annual reports for items pertaining 
to social and environmental categories can be scored using a weighted or unweighted approached. 
There is no specific consensus, either theoretical or empirical, that imply the use of one scoring 
approach over the other. Prior research (Marston and Shrives, 1991) reports the use of either approach 
usually yields similar results. Whilst a scaled scoring system may enable a better determination of the 
quality of each item disclosed, we elected to rely on a dichotomous scale (one (1) if item is disclosed, 
otherwise zero (0)) so as to minimize subjectivity in the scoring process. Thus, the level of social and 
environmental disclosure (hereafter SocScorej and EnvScorej) was defined as the ratio of items from 
the disclosure index reported in the annual report of firm j to the total number disclosure items 
applicable to firm j. The ratio, expressed as a percentage, is arithmetically defined as follows: 











DItemi = social and environmental disclosure index item disclosed by firmj in its annual report 
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ADItemi = social and environmental disclosure index item applicable to firmj when disclosing 
information in its annual report 
i = social and environmental disclosure index item 
j = oil and gas firm. 
Social responsiveness and environmental quality were measured in 2004 and were based on the work 
of Williams (1999). Social responsiveness consisted of three dimensions (human resources, products 
and customers, and community involvement) and measured 30 items. Environmental quality consisted 
of two dimensions (environment and energy) and measured 17 items. Appendix A gives a breakdown 
of the disclosure index used in this study. 
Independent variables 
Corporate governance. To measure board size, we calculated the total number of board 
members for each firm. CEO duality was measured as a dichotomous variable where the firm was 
scored one (1) if the CEO chairs the board, otherwise zero (0). Gender measurement was specific to 
women and for this variable we measured the proportion of women on boards relative to the total 
number of board members. Outside director representation was measured as the proportion of outside 
versus inside directors. All data for corporate governance were obtained from company annual reports 
and were assessed for the year 2004. 
Control variables. Various proxy measures (such as total assets, total sales and market 
capitalization) have been proposed in the literature to measure firm size (Capon et al., 1996). There is 
no overwhelming theoretical or empirical evidence supporting a single measurement of firm size. For 
our study we used total assets. Specifically, LnTotalAssetsj was defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets of firm j for the year 2004. Another control variable, firm leverage (hereafter denoted as 
Leveragej) was measured as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total equity for firm j.  
      It has also been argued that firm age is a determinant of the extent of disclosure in annual 
reports (Cooke, 1989). We measured firm age (hereafter denoted as LnAgej) as the natural logarithm of 
the number of years from incorporation to the year 2004. Given our analysis relates to the oil and gas 
industry, we needed to control for the stage of development for the sample firms. We used a 
dichotomous variable (henceforth denoted as ProdStatusj) to classify firms as either producers or 
junior explorers. Firm j is scored one (1) if it is in the production phase and zero (0) if it is a junior 
explorer. 
      Finally, whilst our study focuses on a single industry, there may be country effects in our 
dataset. To control for any country-specific differences we defined CCode such that a firm j is scored 
one (1) if it is incorporated in Australia and zero (0) otherwise. 
Statistical tests and model specification 
To test and analyse the data collected for this study we used univariate (test-of-means), 
correlation, and cross-sectional regression analysis. The latter test is the primary technique employed 





ROEj = λj + β1BoardSizej + β2Dualityj + β3WomenBdj  + β4OutsideBdj + β5LnTotalAssetsj +β6Leveragej + 
β7LnAgej + β8ProdStatusj + β9CCodej + ηj     {1} 
SocScore j = λj + β1BoardSizej + β2Dualityj + β3WomenBdj  + β4OutsideBdj + β5LnTotalAssetsj 
+β6Leveragej + β7LnAgej + β8ProdStatusj + β9CCodej + ηj    {2} 
EnvScore j = λj + β1BoardSizej + β2Dualityj + β3WomenBdj  + β4OutsideBdj + β5LnTotalAssetsj 
+β6Leveragej + β7LnAgej + β8ProdStatusj + β9CCodej + ηj    {3} 
where: 
λj = the coefficient on the intercept term; 
βi = the coefficients 1 thru 9 on the independent and control variables; and 
ηj = the error term. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled-sample (Panel A) and two national sub-
samples (Panel B – Australian oil and gas firms, and Panel C – Canadian oil and gas firms). The mean 
(median) financial performance for the pooled sample was -6.77%  
(-0.09%), -23.58% (-12.33%) for the Australian sub-sample and 6.93% (2.18%) for the Canadian sub-
sample. Test-of-Means and Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing the mean ROE between the 
Australian and Canadian sub-samples indicated significant difference at conventional levels (1%). 
This suggests that Canadian companies were outperforming their Australian counterparts.  
The mean (median) level of social disclosure for the pooled sample was 5.23% (3.33%), 
7.86% (6.67%) for the Australian sub-sample and 3.08% (3.33%) for the Canadian sub-sample. Based 
on Student t-tests and Wilcoxon Z-scores the means for the pooled- and sub-samples was significantly 
different from zero. Test-of-Means and Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing the mean social 
disclosure between the Australian and Canadian sub-samples indicated disclosure of Australian oil and 
gas firms was significantly higher at conventional levels (1%).  
      The mean (median) level of environmental disclosure for the pooled sample was 8.77% 
(5.88%), 5.33% (0.00%) for the Australian sub-sample and 11.58% (11.76%) for the Canadian sub-
sample. Based on Student t-tests and Wilcoxon Z-scores the means for the pooled- and sub-samples 
was significantly different from zero. Test-of-Means and Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing the 
mean environmental disclosure between the Australian and Canadian sub-samples indicated disclosure 
of Canadian oil and gas firms was significantly higher at conventional levels (1%). 
Descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables report several interesting 
observations. The mean board size in the pooled-sample was 5.11 members. Australian boards had on 
average 4.49 members while Canadian boards had 5.62 members. The difference in the number of 
board members in the Australian and Canadian sub-samples
 13 
 Panel A: Pooled Sample Panel B: Australian Sub-Sample Panel C: Canadian Sub-Sample 
Variables Mean Std Dev. Median Mean Std Dev. Median Mean Std Dev. Median 
ROE j -6.77% 57.33% -0.09% -23.58%† 63.43% -12.33% 6.93% 48.12% 2.18% 
SocScore j 5.23%‡ 7.21% 3.33% 7.86%† 9.54% 6.67% 3.08% 3.24% 3.33% 
EnvScore j 8.77%‡ 8.24% 5.88% 5.33%† 8.01% 0.00% 11.58% 7.35% 11.76% 
BoardSizej 5.11 1.69 5.00 4.49 1.71 4.00 5.62 1.71 5.00 
Dualityj 21.19% 24.53% 18.46%   
WomenBdj 1.62% 6.05% 0.00% 2.58%† 8.13% 0.00% 0.84% 3.44% 0.00% 
OutsideBdj 69.79% 16.44% 71.43% 70.99% 17.95% 66.67% 68.81% 15.17% 71.43% 
TotalAssetsj $412,072,755 $1,784,031,639 $29,264,168 $367,295,898 $1,219,191,251 $15,314,627 $448,583,114 $2,146,570,052 $38,177,187 
Leveragej 17.34% 35.70% 2.30% 11.20% 20.85% 0.00% 22.34% 43.82% 13.14% 
LnAgej 8.11 0.90 8.06 8.27 0.90 8.30 7.97 0.88 8.00 
ProdStatusj 55.08% 62.26% 49.23%   
CCodej 44.92%   
† - Comparison of means (based on Tests-of-Means and Wilcoxon signed rank tests) between the Australian and Canadian sub-samples indicates significant 
differences between the means at the 1% significance level. 
‡ - Student t-tests and Wilcoxon Z-scores calculated for the means indicate significance differences from zero at the 1% significance level. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for pooled-sample and national sub-samples 
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was not statistically significant. On average, 21.19% of the firms analysed had the same individual 
occupying the role of the CEO and Chairman; 24.53% (18.46%) of Australian (Canadian) firms 
exhibit CEO duality. Women representation on boards was very low, with the pooled sample having 
only 1.62% of the board represented by women. Australian firms had a significantly higher number of 
women on the board (2.58%) compared to Canadian boards (0.84%). Notwithstanding the significant 
difference, women representation on boards of oil and gas firms was low compared to other industries 
(EOWA, 2006). The average outside board representation was 69.79% for the pooled-sample, 70.99%, 
and 68.81% for the Australian and Canadian sub-sample respectively. The average size of all firms 
(proxied by the book value of total assets) was $412,072,7551, with the average Australian (Canadian) 
firm size being $367,295,898 ($448,583,114).  The mean level of leverage for the pooled sample was 
17.34%, with Australian (Canadian) firms geared by 11.20% (22.34%). The average age of the firms 
sampled was 8.11 years. Australian and Canadian firms were similar in age – an average of 8.27 and 
7.97 years respectively. 62.26% of the Australian firms were producers (49.23% of the Canadian firms 
were producers). 
Correlation matrix analysis 
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix with the upper half reporting Pearson pairwise 
correlation coefficients (crp), the lower half Spearman correlation coefficients (crs). ROEj is positively 
and significantly correlated with: a) EnvScorej (p < 0.01, crp and crs); b) BoardSizej (p < 0.05, crs); c) 
WomenBdj (p < 0.05, crs); d) LnTotalAssetsj (p < 0.05, crp and p < 0.01, crs); e) Leveragej (p < 0.05, 
crs); f) LnAgej (p < 0.05, crp and crs), and g) ProdStatusj (p < 0.05, crp and p < 0.01, crs). ROEj is 
negatively and significantly correlated with: a) Leveragej (p < 0.05, crs) and b) CCodej (p < 0.01, crp 
and crs). The results suggested that firms that performed better financially were more likely to 
demonstrate environmental quality, had more members on the board, had more women represented on 
the board, and were larger sized firms.  
SocScorej is positively and significantly correlated with a) EnvScorej (p < 0.01, crp and crs); b) 
BoardSizej (p < 0.01, crp); c) WomenBdj (p < 0.05, crp and p < 0.01, crs);  
d) LnTotalAssetsj (p < 0.01, crp and crs); e) LnAgej (p < 0.01, crp); f) ProdStatusj (p < 0.05, crp and p < 
0.01, crs); and g) CCodej (p < 0.01, crp and crs). These results indicated that firms that were socially 
responsive and demonstrated environmental quality had more board members, more women on the 
board, and were larger firms.  Overall results suggested that oil and gas producers exhibited better 
economic performance and social responsiveness. As firms evolve from junior explorers into 
producers, they start making profits but are also likely under greater scrutiny to play a more active role 
in society.  
      EnvScorej is positively and significantly correlated with: a) BoardSizej (p < 0.01, crp and crs); 
b) WomenBdj (p < 0.05, crs); c) LnTotalAssetsj (p < 0.01, crp and crs); d) Leveragej  
(p < 0.01, crp and crs); and e) LnAgej (p < 0.05, crp). EnvScorej is negatively and significantly 





boards, they are likely better positioned to meet the increased information- processing demands that 
sustainability requires. The presence of women on the board also appeared to be associated with better 
financial performance and greater social responsiveness and environmental quality, suggesting that 
women might play a positive role in meeting the information-processing demands brought about by 
sustainability. 
Between the independent and control variables a number of significant correlations are noted. The 
highest Pearson (Spearman) correlation is 0.62 (0.55) between BoardSizej and LnTotalAssetsj (p < 
0.01, crp and crs). The maximum crp and crs values are below critical levels (i.e., 0.8; see Hair et al., 
1995) for multicollinearity to be a serious concern in the 
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Variables 
ROE j SocScore 
j 
EnvScore j 
BoardSizej Dualityj WomenBdj OutsideBdj LnTotalAssetsj Leveragej LnAgej ProdStatusj 
CCodej 
ROE j  0.05 0.23** 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.23* -0.25** 0.22* 0.21* -0.27** 
SocScore j 0.14  0.49** 0.38** -0.14 0.21* 0.14 0.52** 0.06 0.27** 0.23* 0.33** 
EnvScore j 0.43** 0.36** 0.60** -0.17 0.08 0.10 0.58** 0.29** 0.19* 0.11 -0.38** 
BoardSizej 0.20* 0.16 0.56** -0.24** 0.02 0.28** 0.62** 0.29** 0.11 0.09 -0.33** 
Dualityj -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 -0.24** -0.03 -0.31** -0.26** -0.10 0.09 -0.03 0.07 
WomenBdj 0.18* 0.25** 0.19* 0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.07 0.21* -0.04 0.14 
OutsideBdj 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.30** -0.31** 0.10 0.23* -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.07 
LnTotalAssetsj 0.56** 0.30** 0.53** 0.55** -0.27** 0.16 0.29** 0.38** 0.15 0.37** -0.16 
Leveragej 0.21* 0.05 0.31** 0.27** -0.26** 0.22* 0.06 0.40** -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 
LnAgej 0.20* 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.25** 0.07 0.06 -0.10 0.28** 0.16 
ProdStatusj 0.25** 0.23** 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.38** 0.03 0.27**  0.13 
CCodej -0.30** 0.34** -0.47** -0.38 0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.24** -0.23* 0.16 0.13  
 
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 




cross-sectional regression analysis. Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores also indicated no serious 
problems with multicollinearity.2  
Cross-sectional regression findings 
Table 3 reports cross-sectional regression findings based on Equation 1, 2, and 3 for the 
pooled sample. For Equation 1 (Table 4 Panel A) the coefficients on LnTotalAssetsj  
(p < 0.01) and LnAgej (p < 0.05) are positively and significantly associated with ROEj. These findings 
are consistent with theoretical and empirical expectations, plus prior reported correlation findings (see 
Table 3). Larger and more established firms tend to perform better financially than smaller, younger 
firms. Meanwhile, there is a statistically significant negative association between Leveragej (p < 0.01) 
and CCodej (p<0.01) and ROEj. The negative Leveragej and ROEj association implies that highly 
leveraged firms exhibit poor financial performance. Coefficients on all remaining independent and 
control variables were not significant. 
 
Panel A: ROE 
Model 1 
Panel B: Social 
Model 2 
Panel C: Environmental 
Model 3 
Variables β t-statistic β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Constant -2.24 -3.41*** -37.89 -5.45*** -31.83 -3.87***
BoardSizej -0.13 -1.21 0.30 3.20*** 0.29 3.03***
Dualityj -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.41 -0.02 -0.24
WomenBdj 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.91 0.03 0.35
OutsideBdj -0.11 -1.22 -0.10 -1.38 -0.06 -0.76
LnTotalAssetsj 0.36 3.02*** 0.48 4.81*** 0.35 3.41***
Leveragej -0.40 -4.65*** -0.13 -1.84† 0.03 0.42
LnAgej 0.21 2.38** 0.10 1.39 0.16 2.07**
ProdStatusj 0.09 0.99 -0.06 -0.73 -0.05 -0.67
CCodej -0.36 -4.13*** 0.48 6.43** -0.24 -3.12***
Summary 
R2 0.28 0.49 0.46 
F 6.14*** 13.53*** 11.89*** 
N 118 118 118 
 
† p < 0.10 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
Table 3: Cross-sectional regression analysis of pooled sample 
Results for Equation 2 (Table 4 Panel B) indicate the coefficients on BoardSizej  
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(p < 0.01), LnTotalAssetsj (p < 0.01) and CCodej (p < 0.01) are positive and significantly associated 
with SocScorej. There is a moderately significant negative relationship between Leveragej and 
SocScorej (p < 0.10). Results for Equation 3 (Table 4 Panel C) reveal that coefficients on BoardSizej (p 
< 0.01), LnTotalAssetsj (p < 0.01) and LnAgej (p < 0.05) are positively and significantly associated 
with EnvScorej. Contrary to results in Panel B, there is a significant negative association between 
CCodej and EnvScorej (p < 0.01). Results in Panels B and C suggest that larger boards are more likely 
able to meet the information-processing demands of sustainability in order to adequately address and 
even enhance their social responsiveness and environmental quality. These results provide support for 
H1b and H1c. Firms that are responsive to sustainability also tend to be larger firms that have the 
resources to commit to social and environmental activities.  
      The overall results suggested that there were significant differences between Australian and 
Canadian firms regarding what determines their economic performance and social responsiveness and 
environmental quality. Given the apparent strength of Country as a determinant of economic 
performance, social responsiveness, and environmental quality, we decided to conduct additional 
partitioning analysis. We conducted this partitioning analysis in part as robustness checks for the main 
findings, but also to determine if non-significant factors identified in the main results are of any 
explanatory value, albeit masked by the dominance of prominent features such as Country. Thus, we 
partitioned the pooled-sample according to Australian and Canadian firms. Cross-sectional regression 
analysis based on Equations 1, 2, and 3 was then performed again with results reported in Tables 4 and 
5. 
      For the Australian sub-sample, there is a significant positive association between BoardSizej 
and both SocScorej and EnvScorej (p < 0.01). LnTotalAssetsj has a moderately significant relationship 
with ROEj, SocScorej and EnvScorej. Leveragej has a moderately significant positive association with 
EnvScorej.  The results for the Australian sub-sample provided support for H1b and H1c. Larger 
boards in Australian oil and gas firms appeared to facilitate information processing and decision 
making on sustainability, ensuring that social responsiveness and environmental quality was enhanced.  
 
 
Panel A: ROE 
Model 1 
Panel B: Social 
Model 2 
Panel C: Environmental 
Model 3 
Variables β t-statistic β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Constant -3.46 -2.96*** -36.60 -2.95*** -30.93 -3.20***
BoardSizej -0.18 -0.80 0.52 3.28*** 0.50 3.42***
Dualityj 0.08 0.56 -0.04 -0.37 0.05 0.48
WomenBdj 0.08 0.53 0.08 0.73 -0.05 -0.47
OutsideBdj -0.05 -0.31 -0.14 -1.37 -0.10 -0.99





Leveragej -0.10 -0.74 -0.02 -0.19 0.24 2.59**
LnAgej 0.16 0.97 0.13 1.11 0.08 0.77
ProdStatusj 0.08 0.48 -0.12 -0.96 -0.21 -1.81†
Summary 
R2 0.18 0.59 0.65 
F 2.43** 10.48*** 13.04*** 
N 53 53 53 
† p < 0.10 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
Table 4: Cross-sectional regression analysis of Australian sub-sample 
 
The results from the Canadian sub-sample did not support any of the hypotheses. Leveragej 
was the only statistically significant predictor of ROEj. LnTotalAssetsj was the only predictor of 
SocScorej (p < 0.01). LnTotalAssetsj and LnAgej were moderate predictors of EnvScorej (p < 0.05).  
Whilst these findings do not support our hypotheses, they are consistent with prior research – larger 
and more established firms tend to be more responsive to social and environmental issues (e.g., 





Panel A: ROE 
Model 1 
Panel B: Social 
Model 2 
Panel C: Environmental 
Model 3 
Variables β t-statistic β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Constant -1.01 -1.17 -17.85 -2.89*** -35.29 -2.57**
BoardSizej -0.15 -1.17 -0.03 -0.19 0.10 0.72
Dualityj -0.09 -0.77 0.04 0.34 0.01 0.01
WomenBdj -0.01 -0.13 0.10 0.84 0.14 1.15
OutsideBdj -0.07 -0.53 0.07 0.54 -0.06 -0.44
LnTotalAssetsj 0.17 1.10 0.50 3.14*** 0.36 2.26**
Leveragej -0.56 -4.48*** -0.11 -0.80 0.01 0.06
LnAgej 0.18 1.62 0.12 1.03 0.28 2.42**
ProdStatusj 0.10 0.84 -0.02 -0.15 0.05 0.39
Summary 
R2 0.27 0.17 0.20 
F 3.88*** 2.58** 2.97*** 
N 65 65 65 
† p < 0.10  
** p < 0.05  
*** p < 0.01 
Table 5: Cross-sectional regression analysis of Canadian sub-sample 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A primary objective of our study is to further the present understanding of the role of 
corporate governance in enhancing economic performance, social responsiveness, and environmental 
quality. A significant contribution of our study is that it diverges from prior research in several ways. 
First, our study is one of the first to investigate corporate governance and sustainability in the oil and 
gas industry across an international setting. We focus on the oil and gas industry, not only because of 
its current significance to global development, but due to growing recognition by major oil and gas 
firms of a need to better develop sustainable practices (as evidenced by major advertising campaigns, 
for example). This study also makes a contribution in that we examine the disclosure practices of two 
nations who are at the forefront of oil and gas exploration, development, and production. We focus on 
these two nations, not only because the oil and gas industry are key sectors in each nation’s economy, 
but for their similar socio-political environments, economic infrastructures, and accounting regulatory 
frameworks – plus close historical and economic ties. These similarities and ties assist to reduce noise 
in the analysis, making comparison across national boundaries more meaningful. 
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Taking our empirical results overall, we conclude there is support for H1b and H1c for the 
pooled-sample and for the Australian sub-sample. Therefore, evidence suggests that board size plays a 
significant role in the level of social responsiveness and environmental quality of Australian firms 
compared to Canadian firms. In Australia, we posit that larger boards tend to be more diligent in terms 
of discussing and responding to social and environmental responsibilities, whereas firms in Canada 
seem to be able to fulfil their duties without the additional resources available to larger boards. This is 
possibly driven by tighter regulation in North America over firms’ social and environmental 
obligations or by heightened institutional pressures to demonstrate socially responsible business 
practices. In Australia, it appears that firms will only enhance their responsiveness if they have the 
additional resources of a larger board to effectively meet the information-processing demands of 
sustainability. That is, in Australia, larger boards are likely more productive in recognizing issues, 
processing large amounts of information, and making necessary decisions about their social 
responsiveness and environmental quality.  
In the main regression analysis, with respect to other predictor variables, we did not find 
statistical significance between CEO duality, women representation on boards and outside 
representation on boards and sustainability. An apparent explanation for no statistically significant 
finding between women representation on boards and sustainability is that there simply are very few 
women on boards in this sample. For example, in Australia, women represent only 2.58% of board 
composition, while in Canada they represent only 0.84%. Where a ‘critical mass’ of women on boards 
is not reached, their ability to have an impact on information processing and decision making is 
diminished (Rosener, 1995). As for CEO duality, one explanation might be that because many firms in 
the sample are generating losses and are highly leveraged, having one individual serve as both 
chairperson and CEO establishes unity of command and clarity in decision-making authority as firms 
struggle to make a profit. Splitting CEO and chairperson roles, in this sample, might have caused a 
distraction from strong focus on economic responsibilities. As for outside director representation, we 
did find the expected association. That is, the association between outside director representation and 
sustainability was negative across economic performance, social responsiveness, and environmental 
quality. However, the coefficients were not significant and therefore we could not accept our 
hypotheses.        
      As for future research, our results present various options for further empirical research in 
corporate governance and sustainability. One particularly important avenue would be to investigate the 
characteristics of board members and how these may impact the firms’ willingness to improve their 
social and environmental standing. Qualifications, age, and social capital may be potential 
determinants of sustainability efforts within oil and gas firms. Additionally, our research needs to be 
further explored across multiple countries and industries to determine the extent to which corporate 








1. All amounts are denominated in Australian Dollars. 
 
2. The highest calculated VIF is 3.81. As VIFs in excess of ten are deemed to be evidence of serious 
multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1995) standard interpretations of the regression coefficients presented in 
the tables can be made. Other diagnostics (eigenvalues and condition values) further suggest that 
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Appendix A – Disclosure index for oil & gas companies 
 Category of Environmental and Social Disclosure 
A.1 Environment (Environmental Quality) 
A.1.1 General environmental considerations 
A.1.2 Environmental policy 
A.1.3 Environmental audit 
A.1.4 Environmental – product and process-related 
A.1.5 Environmental financially related data 
A.1.6 Sustainability 
A.1.7 Environmental aesthetics 
  
A.2 Energy (Environmental Quality) 
A.2.1 Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations 
A.2.2 Using energy efficiently 
A.2.3 Utilizing waste materials for energy production 
A.2.4 Disclosing energy savings through recycling 
A.2.5 Discussing the company effort to reduce energy consumption 
A.2.6 Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
A.2.7 Research aimed at improving energy efficiency of products 
A.2.8 Receiving an award for an energy conservation programme 
A.2.9 Voicing company’s concern about the energy shortage 
A.2.10 Disclosing the company’s energy policies 
  
A.3 Human Resources (Social Responsiveness) 
A.3.1 Health and safety 
A.3.2 Employees appreciation 
A.3.3 Equal employment policy 
A.3.4 University graduate recruitment information 
A.3.5 Breakdown of employees by line of business 
A.3.6  Breakdown of employees by geographic area 
A.3.7 Number of employees – full time and part time 
A.3.8 Categories of employees by gender 
A.3.9 Corporate policy on employee training 
A.3.10 Amount spent on training 
A.3.11 Employees by minority 





A.3.13 Cost of safety measures 
A.3.14 No. of accidents 
A.3.15 Discussion of employee welfare 
A.3.16 General redundancy information 
A.3.17 Human resources training initiatives 
  
A.4 Products and Customers (Social Responsiveness) 
A.4.1 Product development 
A.4.2 Product safety 
A.4.3 Product quality 
A.4.4 Customer information 
  
A.5 Community Involvement (Social Responsiveness) 
A.5.1 Donations for community activities 
A.5.2 Summer or part time employment of students 
A.5.3 Sponsoring of public health, sporting or recreational projects 
A.5.4 Aiding medical research 
A.5.5 Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibitions 
A.5.6 Funding scholarship programmes or activities 
A.5.7 Supporting national pride/government sponsored campaigns 
A.5.8 Sponsoring community self-help activities 
A.5.9 Supporting the development of local industries or community programmes and 
activities 
 
